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Patent Ecology: Some Interrelationships With
Antitrust and General Law
ARTHUR H.

SEIDEL*

THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE DEFINITION OF THE PATENT RIGHT

The patent bar has been concerned since 1967 with a series of
Congressional bills dealing with a full revision of the statutory patent
law.1 The initial problems that arose in considering these bills were
largely intramural, i.e., confined to the mechanics of the patent law itself. Because of recent judicial decisions, and because of positions advocated by Department of Justice personnel, there has, of late, been greater
consideration of (1) the proper limits to be used in applying antitrust
and patent misuse concepts to a patentee's 2 license arrangements with
others and, (2) the extent to which the federal patent law preempts
the application of contract, unfair competition, and trade secret law
to unpatented subject matter. The time has ripened for a general appreciation, by those not intimately connected with patents, of the role of
our patent system, and for a structuring of a patent philosophy, so that
the extent of a patentee's rights in exercising dominion and control over
the invention covered by his patent grant can be more positively stated.
The patent bar has been remiss in not relating the importance of the
patent grant to our socio-economic system, and in failing to develop
concrete definitions of the powers a patentee should have over the
sharing of his invention with others through the medium of license
arrangements.
Since 1917, when the Motion PicturePatents Co. 3 case was decided,
the application of antitrust doctrine to patentees' arrangements with
other parties has increasingly limited the conditions a patentee may impose in exchange for rights to make, use, or sell patented subject matter.
We have arrived at the point where it is essential, in order to maintain
a workable patent system, to define positively the degree of freedom
which the patentee will have, regardless of antitrust philosophy, to
exercise control and dominion over his patented invention. Application
*B.S., University of Wisconsin; J.D., "farquette University;

-Member, Wisconsin Bar; Partner, Quarles, Herriott, Clemens, Teschner & Noelke, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
'S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and its identical counterparts H. R.
5924 and 6043, were based on a Report of the President's Commission on the
Patent System published in late 1966. The Commission had been engaged in
its studies since August 15, 1965, and concurrently the Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights had been conducting and publishing
a series of studies on the patent system. The aforesaid, initial bill has been
superseded and subsequent bills have included: S. 2164, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); S. 2597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968) ; H. R. 11447, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; H. R. 13951, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) ; S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; S. 1246, 91st Con,., 1st
Sess. (1969); S. 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
2 The term "patentee" as used herein includes assignees of the inventor.
3 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film cMfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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of antitrust law has resulted in formalized and philosophical doctrines
that look toward unrestricted competition. If an overall arrangement
between parties appears to have anti-competitive effects, to restrain
the freedom of action of one party, or to tie up or control some particular market, then the situation is vigorously attacked. With respect to
patents, if such doctrines are carried to an extreme, so that the patentee
is restricted to no more than a modest royalty in exchange for a license,
then there will be such minimal incentive to license that the patent grant
will be reduced to an instrument useful only as an entree into court
for attempting to exclude others from making, using, and selling the
invention. 4 Patentees will be deterred from entering into contractual
relationships containing reasonable restrictions for obtaining adequate benefits from their inventions for fear of being found guilty
of violation of the antitrust laws. However, license contracts are necessary to induce patentees to share their inventions and often to obtain
optimum commercialization. It would be wiser to encourage licensing
through the development of a positive body of rights which the patentee
may exercise when dealing with other parties. These rights would be an
expanded definition of the basic statutory right of exclusion, and would
make patents better tools for inducing innovation.
Patentsare an Essential Incentive in a Complex Society
Our social system rests upon an inordinately complex economic
structure in which our dependence upon one another makes it imperative that a continual, highly productive economy be maintained. Inextricably interwoven with this need is a necessity for effective utilization of those economic costs that enter into the production of usable and
distributable wealth. Traditional economic input factors in the form of
labor, capital, and land and natural resources have limited availability.'
In order to meet today's unprecedented requirements for combating
pollution, controlling population, and funneling large sums into community projects necessary to maintain adequate standards in over-dense,
sprawling urban centers, we must encourage conservation and effective
allocation of economic resources.
Particularly, we must cultivate any resource that can be multiplied
in kind, and there is one outstanding resource capable of such multiplication. This is human innovation. Innovation makes possible new and
4 The right to exclude others from making, using or selling is the statutory
grant to the patentee. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). Standing by itself, this right
is obviously a mere right to litigate. To have only the right to exclude would
diminish the patentee's incentive to share his invention, and thus detract
from the common good.
5 In the United States, the high quality of life cannot be sustained with an
ever expanding population; it has been suggested that our numbers be reduced, which means a decrease in the economic resource of labor. The imminent need for curtailing pollution will undoubtedly require a cut back in
the rate of consumption of many natural resources, thus working a decrease
in another economic input factor.
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better tools and processes for producing goods. It creates entire industries and channels of commerce. It is, in short, the prime expandable
economic resource at our disposal. It gives us new ways of achieving
goals with reduced labor and entrepreneurial numbers, and thus provides a basis for channeling efforts into the solutions of other social
problems. This expandable resource is created through incentives to
the human mind.
The traditional basic incentive has been the possibility of a reward
larger than would result if one's efforts or money were invested more
safely in some business of already demonstrated earning power that
earns a "reasonable return." The patent grant comprising an exclusive
privilege for a limited time has been the vehicle for this incentive. 6 It
functions to allow the marketplace to determine the worth of an invention, similarly as prices in a free competitive economy are the best
measuring stick man has devised for determining the value of a product.
And, the opportunity of a large reward, possible through a patent grant
and proportional to the inventor's own efforts and acumen, incites the
channeling of economic costs into innovation, our primary expandable
resource. In the late 1700's the patent grant was, in the absence of a
yet-to-be-developed business-structured economy, directed to the individual inventor, and our federal constitution is so worded. 7 Today, the
investment of time, effort and money in innovation is largely sustained
by the multi-personed business enterprise, but the incentive to invest in
research and to develop new conceptions is still proportional to the possibility of a larger reward-a result that is less likely when investments
are made in older, time-proven products.8 Thus, patents are as essential
for the company as for the many individual inventors for whom the
patent grant remains a paramount factor in their work.
6The Italian city states granted exclusive privileges as early as the 1300's,
Galileo being a recipient of a Venetian patent for a machine raising water
which obliged him "to construct within one year said new form of machine,
and that it has never before been invented or thought of by others and that
it has never before been the subject of a grant, otherwise the present grant
will be as though never made." English history indicates the existence of
grants for new manufactures as early as 1559. The American colonies followed the English practice for developing colonial industry, and granted exclusive rights to both inventors and those introducing new businesses from
overseas.
7Congress shall have the power "To promote the Progress of Science and the
useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8.
s"The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce,

or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation, from which the
projector promises himself extraordinary profits. These profits sometimes are

very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwise; but in general they bear no regular proportion
trades in the neighborhood. If the project succeeds,
first very high. When the trade or practice becomes
and well known, the competition reduces them to the
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 103.

to those of other old
they are commonly at
thoroughly established
level of other trades."
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It may be said that today we have learned how to invent, and that
inventing has become a professional way of life for many who derive
ample satisfaction and reward from the social prestige and salary that
today's society provides. For a substantial segment this is true, but
in the investment of capital and entrepreneurial talents some legal
protection remains absolutely necessary for those persons and businesses
making such investments in the form of money and manpower. Salaries
for the professional inventor and the provision of laboratory facilities
rest in an ultimate profit, and a profit in speculative research requires
some time-limited exclusivity in order to properly capitalize and recoup its costs. Patents are a vehicle for this necessary protection.
Some judicial statements declare patent grants to be a narrow
exception to the antitrust laws, implying a deep distrust of patents as
being anti-competitive. 9 Patent practitioners dealing on a day to day
basis with these grants draw the opposite conclusion; that is, patents
are, indeed, instruments for fostering competition, and in a unique
manner that gives us a diversity of goods that pure price competition
cannot. For example, the claims of the average patent define a structure,
or process, in terms that by no means dominate a field of commerce. The
opportunity to devise a multitude of competing devices or processes in
the same market is seldom disturbed. The patent a party obtains for an
invention protects an underlying technical concept embodied in a product
which may have unique advantages and features giving a competitive
advantage. Competitors, faced with such advantage, normally seek their
own further improvements, and by developing them move ahead of the
party holding the original patent. This is such a recurrent event that it
becomes manifest patents are instruments of competition which foster
greater diversification of products. Society is provided with a greater
arsenal of competing products from which to choose in making further
advances that open up still new commerces and occupational opportunities. The lead time a party may obtain through a patent grant fosters
competition and is a significant social good. 10
9 "[T]he granting of patent monopolies under this constitutional authority repre-

sents a very minor exception to the Nation's traditional policy of a competitive business economy, such as is safeguarded by the antitrust laws." Aro
AMfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964)
(dissenting opinion).
10 "[A] position of dominance in the market need not be qualified as 'monopoly'
providing it is temporary and the leader is closely followed by competitors
who are free to overtake him in turn. Hence, it does not follow that such
progress as is promoted by the expectation and hope of taking the lead in a
given industry should be attributed to monopoly. It is legitimate to speak of
monopoly only where this competition for the 'lead' is eliminated and the 'lead'
becomes a permanent position of privilege and power-a situation which is
calculated more to hinder than to promote progress. On this reasoning, the
state's legal sanction by a patent of the 'lead', provided by an invention or
innovation, constitutes not only just security for intellectual property rights,
but also an indispensable economic incentive. Patent rights begin to be problematical, however, to the extent that competition is thereby hindered, and
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A hallmark of our society is a widespread distribution of the economic wealth. Individual needs are in the grasp of almost any person
willing to train and apply himself. This distribution depends, in a large
measure, upon a wide variety of goods and services, the existence of
which creates numerous trade channels that so thoroughly interlace
our communities that almost everyone has a substantial participation
in the flow of goods, services, and money.
Without the variety of goods and services we have today, the number
of avenues open for an individual to achieve success in a vocation
would be lessened. Within a given industry, a reduction in the variety
of goods would lessen competition based on the selling of features of
products. Competition would become reduced toward pure price competition, with its deleterious effects upon net earnings and gross income.
An economy that encourages the introduction of a variety of competing
goods will promote the public weal. A diversification of goods competing with one another gives a society superior quality over one in
which there is only price competition in nearly identical goods. Patents
foster this diversification, for the attainment of a variety of goods depends, in part, upon innovation.
History teaches that innovation has not been a natural phenomena
during most of man's recorded years. But, with proper incentives many
individuals display an amazing ability to innovate and advance our
practical arts. Incentives should be encouraged, and our patent laws
should not be so restricted in their application that this particular form
of incentive is excessively curbed.
The business of seeking highly novel creations that embody new
concepts, and which are not merely new designs based on old principles,
is extremely speculative. Much research leads down unproductive alleys,
but in order to expand our technical know-how exploration of the blind
alleys is unavoidable. To counter this frustrating truth, an incentive
of possible large financial gain, larger than for more prudent investment
in existing enterprises, is necessary for inducing persons to risk money
and time in the making of inventions. Through a patent system the
grant of exclusive rights to an invention for a restricted time has furnished such an incentive to those who equip laboratories, finance tooling, and pay salaries of the technically minded. By such exclusive right
society is more likely to pay the true worth of the invention, than in
any arbitrary award system. At the same time the risk of research will
be undertaken if the patent owner can seek, and at times gain, a reward
as large as he can gather in a competitive market place. The possibility
of a reward as handsome as the patent owner may secure in the exercise
of an exclusive right is a necessary compensation for his many fruitless
monopoly rights ending in abuses of market power are created." Wilhelm
R6pke, Economics of the Free Society 162-63 (English translation).
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developments that consume money and time and only show a disappointing loss. A large return is essential to incite a person to venture
into an unknown undertaking.
Our courts frequently justify our patent system only upon the Constitutional phrase "promote the progress of . . . the useful arts." It is

submitted that this public purpose, while paramount, is not to the
exclusion of other purposes. There is for example, a strong morale
motivation." It is unfair for one party to copy outright what another
has pioneered at the expense of much time and effort in developmental
work. Copying, as a sanctioned practice, reduces us to a mediocrity.
One should have some protection for the fruits of his mind, as well as
of his hands. That it is difficult for the law to cope with protection of
the intangible is no reason to deny the morality of affording protection
for mental innovations. We should not lose sight of the fact that the
security a society affords its workers spurs their economic endeavors.12
For spurring inventing, the secuity a patent may offer should not be
narrowly construed or restricted, and a patentee should have ample
latitude in the manner in which he puts his invention to work.
One further observation on the value of a strong, effectively exercisable patent right. Small businesses are frequently dependent upon
the ability to maintain exclusivity in a product. This is necessary for
investing and promoting a new product, and for effective competition
against the large, entrenched firm. Without protection in their developments, small businesses with promising futures are frequently
quite vulnerable. The desirableness of the infusion of new,. independent
businesses into the economy is generally recognized. It develops a
greater number of independent individuals, it gives greater opportunity
to many, and produces a broader, more competitive basis for the economy. It combats the monolithism of the big enterprise. Patents are a
"I "What a man earns by thought, study and care, is as much his own, as what
he obtains by his hands .... Invention, as a right of property, stands higher
than inheritance or devise, because it is personal earning. It is more like
acquisitions by the original right of nature. In all these there is an effort of
mind as well as muscular strength. Upon acknowledged principles, rights
acquired by invention stand on plainer principles of natural law than most
other rights of property. Blackstone, and every other able writer on public
law, thus regards this natural right and asserts man's title to his own invention or earnings." Address by Daniel Webster, 1852.
12 "[Tlhe great risks implicit in an extreme dependence of all individuals in
society upon each other are tolerable in the long run only where an efficiently
administered legal system and an unwritten but generally accepted code of
minimum moral precepts assure to the participants in the division of labor
that they will be able to carry on their activities in an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and security. Economic history is a constant illustration of the
truth that the intensity of economic activity rises or falls in the degree to
which these conditions are fulfilled. Likewise, the spatial extension of economic activity is limited as a rule to the radius within which such conditions,
i.e., monetary and legal security, obtain. This is nothing less than the first
principle underlying the rise and fall, the expansion and contraction of the
economic system itself." R6pke, supra note 10, at 48.
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basic building block for stimulating the technically oriented small business, and these businesses should have ample latitudes in exercising
control over their patent rights.
The small business can frequently improve its position by licensing
its patent rights. Selective licensing is often the only practical program
for the small company that commercializes its inventions by granting
rights to make, use or sell. The selection and limitation of who shall
be a licensee is imperative. Restrictions upon the areas of licensees'
activities, such as model sizes to be built, are frequently necessary to
protect the integrity of the licensing company. The right to deal with
one licensee on terms different from another licensee can also become
necessary, and other arrangements tailored to fit particular situations
are necessary before small businesses can be adequately induced to
share inventions through licensing. In short, the possibility of licensing
under flexibly selected terms is as important an incentive to promote
the useful arts as is the patent grant itself.
MEANINGFUL ITAPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
ARE NECESSARY

For developing an effective utilization of patents, a basic question
is what should be the definition of the patentee's sphere of rights. By
statute, and Constitution, he can exclude others from making, using or
selling for a limited time period. But, this is a bare bones definition,
and if strictly construed would be an unsocial monstrosity. The patentee
would be confining production of the invention to himself, and resorting
to litigation as the sole means of enforcing his rights. Converse to this,
a social purpose of patents is to induce the patentee to share his invention on some terms acceptable to him; i.e. some terms that are bargainable. If he has sufficient productive capacity he may wish to "go it
alone". That is his prerogative, but also the door to sharing through
licensing must be open. This sharing must take into recognition the
preservation of the fundamental nature of a patent-the patentee's exercise of dominion and control over the invention, for a limited time, in
return for having made and then disclosing the invention to the public.
Undue inroads upon the dominion and control of the patentee over
his invention, or upon the extent of his monetary reward, will discourage his sharing. Such discouragement can gravitate toward a deterioration in investing in research, and thus result in a decrease of
that expandable economic resource-innovation. We thus need a positive definition of rights in licensing that amplify the bare rights of
exclusion, in order to make the right of exclusion more meaningful for
the general good.
In this vein, we can briefly itemize some rights a patentee should
be able to exercise in order to have sufficient dominion over his invention to encourage licensing, which encouragement in turn is part of that
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inducement for which the patent system exists. Then, we can compare
these rights with current trends in the law.
The first elementary right in the patentee must be the sole discretion to select who shall be licensed. Lack of the power to select licensees
would quickly place an invention outside the patentee's dominion over
the subject matter. Such would be the antithesis of a right to exclude.
Having the right to exclude, and the further right to waive such exclusion through licensing,"3 it is elementary that the decision as to whom
the waiver shall extend must lie in the patentee, if he is to truly have
an exclusive right in accordance with our Constitutional design. If he
cannot select his licensees, as for example when society dictates that a
patentee must license all parties applying for a license once an initial
license is granted, 14 then the very central concept of a patent being a
right of dominion and control over an invention is denied, and in addition the incentive to share by licensing is lost, all to the impairment of
our general social good.
Second, the patentee must be able to control the licensee's quantum
of practice of the invention. Limits on the number of patented machines
that may be made, or on machine sizes or styles should be well within
the patentee's dominion over his invention. Similarly, a licensee may be
restricted to a territory, or the number of times the invention is practiced, or the type of business or product for which patented devices may
be intended. All of these restrictions fall within the general term "field
of use" licenses. They are nothing more than the patentee exercising
a degree of waiver over his right to exclude. Manifestly a field of use
license is a patentee's exercise of dominion over a lesser part of the
larger right to exclude altogether. We are dealing here with the very
essence of a patentee's control, or dominion, over his invention. As
with other forms of property, the degree to which it may be shared
is the owner's decision. The central core of the patent right is exclusion;
thus if we denied the patentee the right to exclude anyone, including a
licensee, from practicing the invention in some prescribed areas we
would be violating a most basic tenent of the patent grant. Manifestly,
the "exclusive right" guaranteed in the Constitution envisions granting
permission to use an invention in some limited degree. Hence, field of
13 The right to waive exclusionary dominion over an invention by licensing is as
solidly American as apple pie. "An owner of a patent has the right to sell it
or to keep it; to manufacture the article himself or to license others to manufacture it; to sell such article himself or to authorize others to sell it." Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88 (1902). As with other property,
ownership includes the incident of determining who shall use.
1' The concept that all "qualified" applicants must be licensed, once an initial
license is granted, has been advocated in the "WHITE HouSE TASK FORCE
REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY" (1969). As yet, there is no public reaction to
this report by the Department of Justice, but proposals such as this now
lying semi-dormant can readily become tomorrow's active policy implemented
by persons having little regard for the patent system.
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use licenses must be within the rightful sphere of the patentee's activities.
The field of use license is also one of the best methods available
for patentees to share the practice of their inventions with others. They
are a means for licensing without impairing or endangering the patentees'
own activities, and for enhancing the real or anticipated reward of the
patentee. As has been mentioned repetitively herein, maximizing the
incentive to inventors is a goal of the patent law, provided the incentive
concerns utilization of the invention, and not domination of things outside the patent grant.
Third, the patentee should be entitled to bargain for as large a
monetary reward as he can secure. This is part of the bargain the
public makes by granting the right to exclude, and then making the inventor realize whatever income he can secure from his own business
acumen. "Reasonableness" of reward cannot be a test in judging any
license agreement. The possibility of a large reward is the incentive,
and it is a just balance for the many inventions that produce only a loss.
Further, the income a patentee receives bottoms out as the social value
of the invention lessens, similarly as prices in the economy seek the
level the public is willing to pay for a commodity, so we can rely on
normal market forces to temper the size of the reward.
A supplementary problem arises in selecting methods for measuring
a royalty, or payment. For example, the invention may be but a part of
a larger assembly and it is not feasible, or desirable to directly measure
payments by this part of the whole. Or, a patent, or patents, may cover
only a part of a licensee's production, and it is not feasible, or desirable
to ferret out those particular items under the patent, or patents, for
measuring the amount of royalty due. In such instances, any imposition
by the patentee to collect payments on some not unreasonable basis
should be sanctioned.
Another problem arises in so called package licensing; i.e. when a
multiple number of patents are involved. A patentee who has worked
on an item of technology should be entitled to keep this work product
intact. If an item of technology has produced several patents, they should
not be treated as severable against the patentee's wishes. Mandatory
package licensing on the part of a patentee thus has a place in the
scheme of the patent law.
A further problem of package licensing lies in the computation of
royalties, or payments. Namely, must each patent have its price separable from the others? If they comprise parts of a whole, definable item
of technology there should be no such requirement. Licensing as a
package and pricing without regard to the severability of patents should
be within a licensor's prerogative when a unity is involved. In other
situations, reasonable restrictions would seem permissible.
The last problem to be covered here involves grant backs of im-
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provements made by a licensee. Licensing involves the risk that the
licensee, who becomes the party having the most intimacy with an invention, may by generating improvements usurp the patentee's value
in the main invention. As a legitimate security interest, the patentee,
if he requires, should have some rights in practicing a licensee's improvements.
These rights should, at the minimum, comprise a non-exclusive,
royalty-free, non-cancellable license with the right to sublicense others
who hold a license under the original patent. It is not difficult to recognize that some situations may reasonably justify more, such as a grant
of exclusive rights to the licensee's improvements. In no event should
a per se rule of illegality be developed for any form of grant back, and
it is advocated here that the foregoing described "minimum" should,
without question, be an existing right that may be insisted upon.
There is no attempt here to treat all areas of restriction that may
be imposed upon licensees. Rather, in summary, a patentee's dominion
and control over his invention should include (i) power over the degree
of waiver of exclusive rights in the invention, (ii) the selection of licensees, (iii) the amount of award sought, and (iv) the retention of a
group of patents as a package when they relate to a unity of technology
or development. Other restrictions imposable by a patentee should be
within a rule of reason, governed by the test of whether the restriction
is unreasonable in the quest of the patentee for his reward.
A Comparison of the Patentee's Legitimate Area of Control
With Developing Law
We now come to a comparison of the foregoing propositions for
defining a patentee's licensing rights with the present law and directions
toward which it is evolving. The principal curtailments upon the conditions and terms a patentee may impose in contracts with others
revolve around the doctrine of patent misuse. In general, a patentee
may not use his patent as leverage for placing a restraint upon, or
obtaining some control over, or benefit from things outside the scope
of the patent claims. If he does, his patent is unenforceable against
any' party, regardless of whether such party is injured, until the misuse
is purged.
The foregoing doctrine has evolved from application of and analogies to antitrust principles at a pace roughly paralleling growth of our
antitrust law. Early decisions allowed a patent owner to severely limit
the conditions upon which a patented item could be used, and a purchaser could, for example, be restricted to using an invention only with
other products of the patentee that were outside the patent.' 5 Such

15 In Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11 (1912) a restriction reading "This

machine is sold by the A. B. Dick Co. with the license restriction that it may
be used only with the stencil paper, ink and other supplies made by A. B.
Dick Company, Chicago, U.S.A." was upheld. The larger right of exclusive
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decisions were overruled, so that a patentee could no longer condition
sale of a patented machine to use with materials that are no part of
the patent claims.' 6 Licenses conditioned on purchase of unpatented
materials were also held improper extensions of the scope of the patent
monopoly, so that persons selling the unpatented materials were not
guilty of contributory infringment.17 Then, in 1942 conditions in leases
of patented devices requiring a lessee to use non-patented items with a
patented machine were condemned, and the term "misuse" was born.',
The patentee was not entitled to an injunction against a direct infringer
of the patent claim, so long as the patent was being used to gain control
over or restrain competition in an unpatented article.
The propositions advanced in this paper are compatible with the
traditional misuse doctrine. The dividing line between control over the
subject matter within the patent claims, and attempted control or restraint over subject matter outside the patent claims, as developed in the
foregoing misuse cases, is the line that defines legitimate dominion and
control by a patentee over his invention. It is the boundary between
the exclusive right of the patent law and illegal restrictions in the
general law. However, the Department of Justice is advocating a breakdown of this boundary. The Department seeks to leave every licensing
arrangement open to question with a test of legality being a hindsight
ss I ;)ios padope hAEL[
:it[jm @uawd Dql
A x jo UOTSZAUt
restrictive alternative.19 The resulting uncertain state of flux would
leave every licensing patentee in a state of suspension regarding the
legality, and hence social morality, of his acts. This is untenable for
inducing the sharing of inventions, or for creating the necessary security
a society must furnish its citizens in approving their acts, so as to
enhance their social contributions. Rather than to have such a constant
state of uncertainty, we must positively define at least a part of the
boundary of the patent monopoly in licensing arrangements, to include
use of the patentee was said to embrace the lesser one of permitting use
upon prescribed restrictions.

16 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).

Control of restriction of materials to be used in operating a machine were to
be derived from the general law, not the patent law, for this concerns matters
outside the patent.
17 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27 (1931) ; Leitch MIfg. Co. -. Barber Asphalt Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
's Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); B. B. Chemical

Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).

19 Richard IN. McLaren stated in an address:
In considering whether to attack a particular licensing provision or
practice, we ask ourselves two fundamental questions. First is the particular provision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploitation
of his lawful monopoly. Second, are less restrictive alternatives which
are more likely to foster competition available to the patentee. Where
the answer to the first question is no and the second question yes, we
will consider bringing a case challenging the restriction involved.
Address by Richard W. McLaren, United States Assistant Attorney General,
June 5, 1969.
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sole control, or determination over who shall practice the subject matter
of the patent claims, the extent of such practice, and for what fee.
The invasion of general law-antitrust concepts into the very nucleus
of the patent right is illustrated by the present Justice Department
attack upon field of use licenses. 20 Now, field of use licenses have been
regularly upheld, 21 and they are by nature wholly within the ambit of
the patent law: i.e., the exercise of waiving the exclusive rights of
making, using or selling. A justice Department theme, in attacking
field of use licenses, appears to be that competition between licensees
appointed to different fields is restrained. This theme imports antitrust
rationale directly into the nucleus of the patent law, namely the Constitutional and statutory right of dominion and control over the right
to exclude others from making, using or selling by either (i) complete
enforcement of the exclusionary right, or (ii) partial relinquishment
through waiver or licensing, so that a licensee can share an invention
with the patentee. There is no precedent for injecting antitrust rules
into the core of the patent right. To do so destroys the patent right, for
two directly opposite concepts cannot subsist within the patent law
itself.
Aside from the legal error in the Justice Department theory, field
of use licenses play an important role in promoting the use of inventions. Small businesses employ them for opening new fields to inventions without undue jeopardization of their own activities. Companies
'cLaren, in his address, supra note 19, stated with regard to field of use
licenses: "[S]uch restrictions in effect grant a submonopoly to each of the
licensees, and all competition among those who would be likely competitors
will bring a case directly
is eliminated. In due course, I expect that we
challenging restrictions of this type." Roland V r. Donnem, Director of Policy
Planning for the Antitrust Division, in a subsequent address to the Michigan
Bar, stated that it is unlikely that a field of use license could be justified, and
that a burden of proving absolute economic necessity for an exclusive field
of use restriction should rest on the patent owner. He further prophesized
that if U.S. v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926), involving control of
prices, is overruled, then General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric, 304
U.S. 175 (1937), the basic case for supporting field of use licenses, will also
fall. M%,r.
Bruce B. Wilson, assistant to Mr. \IcLaren, has stated that the
Department of Justice has brought cases against pharmaceutical makers challenging their right to prohibit sales of patented products in bulk form. He
probably refers to U.S. v. Ciba Corp., filed July 9, 1969 (the government is
attacking restrictions to sell certain diuretic drugs in dosage form only),
U.S. v. Ciba Corp. and CPC International (the government is attacking a
license to make and sell a drug in bulk form only, with the patent owner
agreeing not to issue additional licenses for bulk sales), and U.S. v. Fisons
Limited, filed July 23, 1969 (the agreements under attack are limited to dosage
form only and in limited fields).
21 The leading case is General Electric Pictures v. Western Electric, 272 U.S.
476 (1926). See also Armstrong v. Motorola, 374 F.2d 764, 775 (7th Cir.
1967) (Armstrong had the right to restrict licensee's sales to certain classes
of customers) ; Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 556, (S.D. N.Y.
1969) (the patentee could license chemicals for regulating plant growth to
some parties for agricultural use at one royalty and to other parties for nonagricultural use at a different royalty) ; Deering, Millikin & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp. 463, 480 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (license restricted sale
of a patented fabric to specified fields).
20
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with special abilities in special fields can be licensed, so that an invention
can be promoted effectively in different fields. Absent the right to grant
field of use licenses, a patentee would, if it licensed, axiomatically only
license the large conglomerate. In short, it is competitively beneficial
to have patentees exercise control over their licensee's activities of
making, using and selling. It would be directly consistent with the concept of a patent giving a patentee economic control over a new invention
to provide by statute that a patentee can waive in whole or in part the
right to exclude others from making, using or selling. And, the time
is ripe to write such provision into the statutes to enhance advancement
of the useful arts through innovation.
The right of the patentee to select his licensees is also coming under
attack from government officialdom.22 One court has also declared, although in an apparent pique at the parties before it, that a patentee
cannot assert his rights if he refuses to license an applicant when he
has already granted a license to the applicant's competitor.2 3 If a patent
system, as ours, requires the patentee to seek and work out his reward,
then a clear corollary is that he must be able to select those with whom
he will share in practicing the invention. From the standpoint of legal
precepts, this again is a matter of dominion over the subject matter of
the patent grant, and in view of the threatened invasion upon the right
to select licensees it is timely to enact a statute spelling out such a freedom.
Setting the price a licensee should pay the patentee has, under
recent decisions, become unduly complex, so much so average counsel
responsible for drafting license contracts can easily be prey to a growing
body of unsuspected and ill-defined rules. This is particularly true
when the patentee has a group of related patents and seeks to license
the group. Some cases imply that the royalty rate charged must decrease as the patents expire, without regard to whether the parties considered this matter in negotiation.2 4 Other cases require that there must
have been a coercion on the part of the licensor before a constant royalty
Remarks of both McLaren and Donnem attack exclusive licenses without the
right to grant sublicenses. McLaren has stated: "One of my predecessors
suggested-and I think rightly-that the rule of Krasnov should be extended
to make unlawful any sole or exclusive license without sublicensing rights."
Address, supra note 19.
Donnem's remarks, made before the Michigan Bar, were: "[Tjhere is something to be said for the view, that the rule of Krasnov should be extended to
make unlawful any sole or exclusive license without sublicensing rights."
In addition, the White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy released May 21, 1969, recommends that whenever a patentee issues a license
he must thereafter license all other qualified parties that apply for a license.
22 Allied Research v. Heatbath, 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. II1. 1969).
24American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3rd
Cir. 1959); Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367
F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966).
22
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be declared illegal.' 5 Another rule is that a licensee, if he requests, must
be able to select patents from a group at a varying royalty rate depending upon the patents selected.2 6 And further, compulsory package licensing has been condemned as a patent misuse, on the theory the price
commanded for one patent is leverage for securing a price on another
patent. 7 The tragic result of these cases is the gamesmanship introduced
into license negotiations. A prospective licensee can play an effective
game of cat and mouse by first seeking a license for the group, then
seeking reduced royalties as patents expire, and then selecting different
combinations of patents at different royalties, all for the purpose of
drawing the unwitting patentee into a violation of the case law.
The developing case law overlooks the manner in which the marketplace usually determines royalty rates, and thus the law is deviating
from a realistic approach. Royalties, based on sales of goods, are typically dictated by determining the prospective percentage profits may
constitute of net sales, and then applying some reasoning as to what
share of profits might be attributed to the invention. In other words,
for the licensed product, what portion of the selling price is the licensee
willing to pay the patentee? In some industries, custom establishes a
norm for a royalty, from which there is little deviation. There are also
numerous secondary factors in determining a royalty, such as: the
strength of the patents, computation of an adequate return on the
patentee's investment, whether or not the license is exclusive, et cetera.
For licensing a process invention, another sound basis for determining
a royalty may be the savings obtained using the process. It has not
been a practice in the marketplace to set royalties on the basis of the
number of patents or claims in force, and to vary royalties with expiration dates. These incidents have come into being from court decisions,
and such decisions have created artificial licensing criteria.
Presume an inventor develops, as an item of technology, a furnace
recirculator with controls that drastically reduce pollutants issuing
from the stack, and secures a number of patents for the development.
Whether we break up his development into several patents, or retain
them as a unit, for purposes of licensing, should be of negligible legal
consequence. Otherwise, we put form, derived from the particular
patent system involved, over the substance of a cohesive development
project with a central objective. The inventor should be free to retain
his development as an integral package when he seeks to license. The
market place normally treats a development as a unity, and if the life
25
26
27

McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965);
Well Survey, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968).
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25, 156 U.S.P.Q. 229,
234-236 (7th Cir. 1967), other grounds considered at 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir.
1959).
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of the law is experience, rather than mere logic, then let the experience
of the market set the rule that an inventor solely determine how his
project shall be subdivided. Absent some clear intent to gain control
over matters outside the inventive subject matter, in all reasonableness,
one royalty rate and a mandatory retention of all patents in one package
should be the right of the patentee when dealing with a developed unit
of technology. The metes and bounds of an item of technology may,
at times, be difficult to define, but it is a fact determination worthy of
the sanction of packaging licensing.
There are other problems in setting a royalty, beside the package
license problems, which require some mention here. First, there is
28
lingering authority that a patentee cannot charge "excessive" rates.
A reasoning advanced for limiting royalty rates is that somehow competition is restrained. If the competition be with other articles, then
the patentee and his licensee may have priced themselves out of a
market. But here, general principles of free, open price competition,
which are so vigorously touted by antitrust advocates, should prevail.
If we do not allow the practice of the patentee to solely set the price
for which a licensee may share that which he owns, but instead impose
a royalty ceiling by government, or judicial fiat, the incentive of the
patent system is destroyed. In many instances the realization of a
large return induces further research and inventing. The patentee's
income is plowed back into his work, and thus a refusal of the law
to arbitrarily set ceilings on the amount of a possible reward is an incentive to continue to invent and compete in the market.
Turning to the problem of different royalties in different licenses,
which is a sub-topic of the subject of competition between licensees,
this is an area that should be staked out as under the sole control of the
patentee, absent, of course, any intent to use a patent to injure one
licensee at the favor of another (which is a matter outside the patent
law). The patentee is the owner of the invention, and a basic concept
of the legal monopoly of ownership is freedom from competition in
one's own commodity. This freedom must exist between a patentee
and a licensee, and logically between licensees, if the patentee so desires.
But, when the patentee, or licensee, parts ownership with embodiments
of the invention, then the freedom from competition no longer exists
with respect to these embodiments in the hands of third parties.2' The
freedom from competition concerns intramural events between a
28
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In American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1966), a preliminary injunction was vacated and what was described as excessive royalties were condemned; then, after a trial on the merits, the court
found no oppressive royalties, but definitely left open the proposition that
high royalty rates per se can run afoul of the law. 384 F.2d at 813.
See U.S. v. Schwinn Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and its application to attempt
control over resale of patented material in U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302
F. Supp. 1, 162 U.S.P.Q. 513 (D.C. Col. 1969).
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patentee and those with whom he shares the invention, and it is an
essential aspect of the precept that a patent gives to the inventor exclusive control and dominion over his invention. We do not want to stifle
licensing by forcing a patentee to lose his control over a licensee's practice of the invention.
By licensing, a patentee should not become subject to claims from
licensees of some unequal treatment affecting competition with another.
Rarely are two licenses of like content, and the door would be open
to all sorts of ingenious claims, the net result of which would make
multiple licensing a tenuous venture. Let us not turn a patentee's willingness to license against him; the social consequences of negativing
innovation is not worth the price.
The unusual results that can flow from considering licensees to
have a right to royalties that place them on an even footing with one
another is illustrated in the "Shrimp Peeler" cases.30 These cases involved the supplanting of hand cleaning shrimp with patended machines.
The patent owners had a shrimp canning operation in the Gulf of
Mexico and licensed canners in the Gulf are at a rate computed on labor
saving involved. Later, they licensed Pacific Northwest canners, who
previously had not engaged in any significant shrimp canning business.
Cleaning shrimp in the Gulf required less handwork than cleaning the
smaller shrimp in the Northwest, and the licenses granted to the Northwest canners were also calculated on labor savings, with the result
that the rates per machine operation were higher in the Northwest.
However, the original competitive differential between the two regions
were maintained at about the same level, with the Pacific Northwest
canners in a slightly improved position. Several Northwest canners,
however, lost money, and were not able to compete. The FTC found
an "unfair practice" under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and the Fifth Circuit held the arrangements as discriminatory. The
Alaska court found the differing rates to be arbitrary, and in the Washington case a jury verdict finding an an antitrust violation was upheld.
If the royalties based on labor saving were discriminatory, then it is
evident that rate schedules based solely on machine operation would
also be discriminatory, but in such instance against the Gulf canners
instead of the Northwest canners. Introduction of the invention had
such a profound effect on the industry that it could not maintain a
status quo. The decisions placed the patentee in a untenable position
when it offered to grant licences.
The "Shrimp Peeler" cases imply that a licensor may be responsible
for preserving competition that would not exist in the absence of licens30

Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alaska 1965) ; LaPeyre
v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Peelers v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193

(Wash. 1966).
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ing! It would have been better for the licensor to not have licensed in
the Northwest! Rather than try to apply rules of restraint or antitrust
doctrine in cases such as these, better to permit the patentee to set
his price for sharing his invention.
A word is necessary on the question of permitting royalties to be
paid after the expiration of a patent. In Brulotte v. Thys Co.31 this
was condemned in broad terms by the Supreme Court. The decision
has been criticized on the ground that payments continued beyond expiration may be in the nature of installment payments on a loan that
has been extended in time and royalties during the life of the patent
may be reduced in amount.3 2 The rationale of such criticism has such
merit that we should permit, by statute if necessary, payment of royalties after expiration if they are based on acts under the patent prior
to expiration.
The last licensing problem area for consideration in this paper is
the matter of requiring licensees to grant back to the licensor any
improvements they may make. The Supreme Court has sanctioned this
condition 33 , but it is, and has been, a favorite target for the Justice
Department.3 4 While some grant back provisions might perpetuate
control over an area of commerce after the patentee's patent privilege
expires, in other cases licensee improvements might quickly obsolete
or make valueless the patentee's technology if practiced without such
improvement. As a security to induce licensing, some degree of right
to use a licensee improvement is essential. As earlier stated herein, a
rule of reason is justified, with a minimum of a non-exclusive, royaltyfree license with a right to sub-license. Stabilization of the law by
statute is in society's best interest.
A Case-by-Case Approach to Solve
Licensing Problems Will Be Deleterious
The Justice Department aims to preserve a case by case approach
in its goal of limiting a patentee's control over his invention.3 5 This, of
31379 U.S. 29 (1964).
32 Baxter, Legal Restrictions

on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis. 76 YALE L. J. 267. at 328 (1966) ; Lipscomb, Package Patent
Licensing: A Practical Analysis, PATENT L. REV. 509 (1969).
33 Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
34 "We expect to bring cases under Sherman Act Section 1 against patent licenses
which reouire an assignment or license grantback of all improvement patents.",
Address by R. W. Donnem, Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust
Division, before Michigan Bar Convention; see also, Address by R. McLaren, supra note 19, for identical remark. The Justice Department view is
that grantbacks might only be permissible if they are non-exclusive licenses
for improvements on basic patents with royalties payable on the improvements, and then it argues that grantbacks stifle license-research. This is a
hollow assertion, for we know that when a company takes a license its engineering staff then becomes free to develop and do research in other areas;
grantback requirements do not inhibit the total innovation of an engineering
department.
35 Chemical & Engineering News, Feb. 9, 1970, page 35.
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course, provides an endless opportunity to develop and finely hone legal
propositions that whittle at the patent law. Such whittling is not only
evidenced, but proven, by the recent effort of the Justice Department
to outlaw the present doctrine of equivalents, as an amicus curiae in
Standard Industries,Inc. v. Tigrett Industries.3 3
Quite predictably, deciding issues on a case by case basis will result
in an overwhelming application of antitrust doctrine into the very core
of the patent grant. This is because lawyers and jurists, as a whole, are
schooled and versed in antitrust concepts, while they have little acquaintance with the overall scheme of a patent system, and have minimal
exposure to the philosophic thrust of the system or to first hand acquaintance with development engineering. On a case by case basis,
there is insufficient realization of the general order and purpose of the
overall patent system, and the facts of each particular case may becloud
a deeper public purpose in inciting innovation by giving an exclusive
privilege, from which the patentee must then forge his own reward.
A statute defining a patentee's rights in licensing will give necessary
stabilization for encouraging utilization of inventions. Further, it will
clarify the patentee's exercise of rights, in sharing his invention, that
are necessary incidents of his exclusionary rights. These incidents make
patents more useful tools for social gain than the mere right of excluding others from making, using and selling by resort to litigation.
36 This doctrine states that if a device charged as an infringement does not
meet the literal wording of a patent claim, but attains substantially the same
result in substantially the same manner by substantially the same construction
it is the equivalent and stands as an infringement, unless there is an inconsistency with the prior art or representations made to the patent office in
solicitation of the patent. The doctrine has been a part of our law from
the first time it was raised as a proposition. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 330 (1853) and Machine Co. v. M\urphy, 97 U.S. 120 (1877). Its
existence is relied on in our statutes, to-wit: "An element in a claim for a
combination may be expressed as a means .

.

. and .

.

. shall be construed to

cover the corresponding structure . . . in the specification and equivalents
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964). This doctrine is an equitable principle based
on necessity, arising from the fact inventions are mental concepts difficult to
express in words, and it defies normal ability to unfailingly define the scope
and breadth of an invention in words. Patent attorneys preparing patent
claims do not have the sheer clairvoyance, or knowledge of many substitutions known in a technical art, to unerringly describe the metes and bounds
of an invention in order to protect their clients' inventions in words alone.
In Europe, it is the common practice to clearly and distinctly point out in
the claims the invention as described, and then in litigation the courts resolve
the breadth of the invention. This may be a better practice than ours, and
our doctrine of equivalents arises to give us as satisfactory a system. Without it, fraud can be too easily practiced upon patents. Graver Tank & 'Nffg.
Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). The point being made
is that a small group in the Department of Justice, the individuals of which
have no extensive experience in representing patentees in patent matters,
take upon themselves to devlop theoretical attacks upon the patent system.
To allow them a free hand in the area of patent right-antitrust conflict is
inimical to our social good, and timely statutes should preserve the patentee's
rights. Fortunately, the Supreme Court decided Standard Industries, Inc. v.
Tigrett Industries without any reference to the doctrine of equivalents.
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The patent grant, as an encouragement for investing time and money
in the high risk activity of innovation, remains a sound social tool. To
be of value it should be exercisable in a manner that the patentee is
induced not only to make and sell his invention, but to license and share
the invention by making contractual arrangements with others. Antitrust concepts should not be extended to the point of retarding invention sharing, nor should the law purposely be unduly unsettled by proceeding on a case by case basis in all areas of licensing. Rather, a statute should define the patentee's rights in the area of licensing, and we
should seek to develop some positive definitions of the incidents of the
patent grant.
The Developing Paralysisof a Preemption Doctrine
in 1964 the Supreme Court took the unique step in the Sears and
Cornpco cases 37 of expanding the sphere of the Federal patent law to
deny the states the right to control the appearance of unpatented
articles. Over the years, there had developed a large body of state
unfair competition law that afforded protection from slavish copying,
or imitation, of distinctive designs of articles of a non-functional character that had acquired secondary meanings in the mind of the relevant
public that such designs were an indication of the source of the articles.
The analogy to trademarks is obvious, and quite logically distinctive
appearances of non-functional portions of articles were treated similarly
as descriptive words that become trademarks. The law, then, was giving credence to the condition of the public mind, and this primarily for
the purpose of protection of the public, so that it would be the victim
of confusion or mistake in selecting goods. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court found this body of unfair competition law to be incompatible,
under the Supremacy Clause, 38 with the Federal patent law that grants
exclusive rights only to true inventions that meet statutory requirements
of patentability. Federal law implies that what is not patented may be
copied. As a result, the states must resort to labeling requirements
as the sole means of diminishing public confusion. Except where articles
are not susceptible of adequate labeling which will catch the purchaser's
eye, the overturning of unfair competition doctrine raises no particular
problem. But, the extension of Sears and Compco into a doctrine that
the Congressional provisions for the granting of patents prohibits the
courts from enforcing trade secrets and contracts involving unpatented
technical information has become an alarming spectre.
The case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 39 has now brought us to the threshhold of this spectre. There, Adkins invented an improved gyro and
3 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
39395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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entered into a license agreement with Lear in return for royalties.
A patent application was filed, and Lear ceased paying royalties before
the patent issued in the belief Adkins had failed to make a patentable
invention. As soon as a patent did issue, suit was brought by Adkins
on the contract. The state court (California) awarded Adkins judgment for all past royalties without going into the question of patent
validity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the licensee Lear
could contest the validity issue, and it sent the case back for the determination of patent validity. One issue not decided was whether royalties could be collected for the period prior to the date of patenting if
the patent is invalid. During this period the application was in secrecy
and Lear had available to it, and used, technology developed by Adkins.
Three of the Justices would deny Adkins any right to receive consideration under a contract for divulging such technical information:
What the Court does in this part of its opinion is to reserve
for future decision the question whether the States have power
to enforce contracts under which someone claiming to have a
new discovery can obtain payment for disclosing it while his
patent application is pending, even though the discovery is later
held to be unpatentable. This reservation is, as I see it, directly
in conflict with what this Court held to be the law in Sears,, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel
and Compco [that] one who makes a discovery may, of course,
keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under which
self-styled 'inventors' do not keep their discoveries secret, but
rather disclose them, in return for contractual payments, run
counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate the
kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in
which they may be protected. The national policy expressed in
the patent laws favoring free competition and narrowly limiting
monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among
individuals, with or without the approval of the State. (J. Black
concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 395 U.S. 676, 677)
Thus, there is a very real and dangerous present threat that parties
developing bodies of technological know-how might not be able to vend
them as a commodity for which they can receive and enforce contractual payments. The common industry practice of developing comprehensive bodies of technical information and know-how, and contracting
for its disclosure to establish production facilities of licensees, would
be struck down by enforcement of the above quotation. By simple
extension of the Sears and Compco principle, entire bodies of confidential information upon which engineering and research departments are
bottomed may become free game for the copiers and those willing to
engage in espionage and other deceitful practices.
A very important segment of our economy is based on the accumu-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

lation of technical data. Part of such data constitutes important lead
time over competitors and represents tremendous investments in time,
money and effort. Part of it is disclosed to suppliers and others in
the trade on a presumed confidential basis. Part of it becomes known
to the public in the form of finished products, if the public stops to
measure and closely assay such products. Men's jobs and the success
of businesses rest in the development and use of such information. The
great bulk of this information is not susceptible of patenting, and actually patents are not a satisfactory vehicle of protection even if technical
information fell within the catagories of patentable subject matter. To
enlarge the preemption rule in Sears and Compco to the advocated
position above in Lear seems motivated by an animosity toward technical spheres of our economy, or a lack of appreciation of the endeavors
of men working in creative pursuits of the practical arts.
Prior to Lear, the commentators were divided as to whether Sears
and Compco affected unpatented technical information. 40 Lear appears
to be a step toward confirming the views of the pessimistic. Hence, the
time is ripe to state in our statutory patent law that Congress has not
preempted areas of trade secret and contract law by providing for
patents.
The concept of a broad preemption of the patent law over all things
unpatentable is highly questionable. There do not appear to be any
past, persuasive roots in our law upon which to anchor such a preemption. It has been held that when a patent expires the public has
the right to make precisely what is shown in the patent, and that the
public can share in the "goodwill" of an unpatented item.41 But this
does not support the concept that any article may at all times be freely
copied if not patented, for example when the sharing of "goodwill" is
deceptive. Nor has there been demonstrated need, or any vocal support
for the theory that the Federal patent law, which only deals with granting and enforcing patents, preempts all law regarding non-patented
matters and the rights of states to grant injunctions from copying
appearances of non-functional character.
The proposition of preemption expressed in the Sears and Cornpco
cases overlooks a basic fact that article patents are not concerned with
protection of surface configurations. 42 A patent for an article, or
machine, protects an underlying concept of the inter-related aspects
of the parts or elements of such article, or machine, without regard to
surface styling. Thus, the appearance of the patented article may take
CORNELL L. REV. 189 (1970).
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120, 122 (1938).
42-We do not overlook design patents, but they are inapplicable to configurations of parts of articles and ornamentation that does not meet the standard
of invention. The worth of a design patent is questionable as long as they
must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964) and courts strike
them down with regularity.

40 See Handler, Antitrust 1969, 55
41
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an infinite variety of embodiments, none of which are germane to the
patent claim. No one is foreclosed from practicing the underlying
concept protectable by a patent when he is merely enjoined from slavishly copying non-functional surface configurations. It clearly follows
that rules forbidding acts of unfair competition by product simulation
relate to matters outside of a patent grant, and therefore are not in
conflict with the subject matter of patents. Conseqluently, there was no
need or compelling reason to invoke any doctrine of preemption in the
Sears and Compco cases.
There is some indication in Compco that the Constitution restricts
any arm of government from prohibiting copying of unpatentable
subject matter.4 3 But a look at Constitutional history belies such proposition. At the time of the Constitutional Convention it was recognized
that the individual states could not adequately provide for the grant of
patents, for the conflicts between jurisdictions would become uncontrollable. The states therefore delegated power to grant patent privileges
to the Federal government, without any indication of an intent to
strip themselves of other powers they may inherently have had in re44
gard to controlling matters of manufacture.
A striking consequence of the Sears and Compco decisions is the
rejection of the business morality that had been developed by the state
rules of unfair competition. The state rules deterred sharp practices
of capitalizing upon public confusion by slavishly imitating others'
goods. All the state law required was that a man devise his own surface configurations. Such law made no restriction upon the right to
duplicate the mechanical essence of a device which lies in the domain
of patents. Free and open competition remained, but on a plane above
that condoning trade deceit.
It is a fair conclusion that the broad preemption enunciated in Sears,
Compco and Lear is unnecessary, and that extending it to its limits
will irreparably injure an important segment of the economy. It is
urged that a statute remedy the existing situation, for otherwise, ab"[T]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain ...
" Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. at 237.
4 The history associated with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 VWrheat.) 1 (1824),
suggests that the framers of the Constitution never contemplated complete
divestiture by the states of the power to exercise some control over articles
and manufactures. That case dealt with the power of the state of New York
to grant an exclusive right for steamboats. Chancellor Kent of the New York
Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit states from granting such
exclusive ri hts, for fhey did not relate to inventions. Justice Marshall overruled the Ilew York court, but he declined to discuss the patent issues involved, and based his decision on the supremacy of the commerce clause of
the Constitution, to the effect that a state could not interfere with matters in
interstate commerce. That he declined to consider the patent issues is an indication that it was not clear that the federal power to grant patents had fully
preempted state rights in such matters as we are now dealing with.
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stract legal reasoning may be employed to paralyze the important work
of innovation. We already have an expression in the lower court
opinion in Painton Company Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc.4 5 that preemption of
the Federal patent law denies a person the right to a consideration in
exchange for disclosure of his ideas unless he has applied for a patent.
Absent a statute indicating that Congress has not preempted the heretofore existing rights to contract for one another's ideas or to protect
one's confidential information, a few jurists may impose upon us an
entirely different legal order concerning intellectual property than that
which we have previously enjoyed.
It is the nature of engineering work to develop bodies of knowledge
which must be given a proprietory value, protected by law. A legally
protected value supports a willingness to pay salaries and consultation
fees, and it encourages numerous men and firms to develop technical
know-how that is vended as a commodity. Such legal protection forms
a security for the jobs of technically trained people, and without such a
security men will lose an incentive to innovate. Further, bodies of
technical know-how will not be licensed and exchanges of information
such as have advanced our economy, and the economies of other countries will cease. Large amounts of business rest on know-how agree45 U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., Case No. 68 Civ. 3834. The opinion in this case is dated
February 4, 1970, and reads in part:
California courts must obey the dictates of the Supremacy Clause,
follow federal law, and refuse to enforce defendant's trade secrets in
respect to those models covered by a patent.
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the 1962 contract, Painton agreed to pay
royalties on models for which no patent application had been or would
be made. Painton is not required, however, to make any future payments. This court's enforcement of such an agreement would be contrary to our national patent law and policy, Lear vs. Adkins, supra.
Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be undercut
if inventors could enforce agreements for compensation for alleged
secret ideas without being required to submit these ideas to the Patent
Office, and, thereby, eventually have the ideas disclosed to the public.
Furthermore, patent policy (reaffirmed by the holding in Lear that
estoppel will not be a bar to challenging the validity of a patent, Lear
at 655-71) which allows compensation only for ideas which rise to the
level of invention would be further undermined by the enforcement
of such a contract, since compensation would be awarded for noninventions. And if this court were to hold that before a state could
enforce a trade secrets contract, the ideas must be found to be an invention as prescribed by the rigid requirements of federal patent law,
inventors would be able to circumvent "the manner in which (inventions) may be protected." Lear, at 677. Inventors would be encouraged
to avoid filing applications altogether and contract for long licensing
arrangements. The severely restricted area which the Supreme Court
left open to applicable State law would become a yawning abyss. Fewer
patent applications would be made. The Patent Office would soon have
a less accurate view of the state of the art in a particular field. And
state courts, rather than the Patent Office, would become the initial
triers of whether a discovery is an invention.
For these reasons, this court holds hat federal patent law requires
an inventor to submit his ideas to the Patent Office before he can compel consideration for the use of his idea.
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ments, both domestically and abroad, and the United States will stand
oddly alone among the nations, if we follow the preemption doctrine
now being cultivated in our courts.
The interchange of ideas for a consideration has been a cornerstone
of society. The painter receives a commission for his renditions, an
author of simple writings receives royalties on his published works,
the architect delivers a set of plans for a price, and a business consultant
obtains a handsome "finders fee" for arranging a corporate merger.
Why, in the same vein, cannot a technical idea be conveyed for a consideration? Business has depended upon such exchanges, and no meritorious reason has been given in Sears, Compco, Lear, or Painton why
we should destroy the asset value of technical ideas, which in the past
have created new industries and inspiring vocations. Just why should
grown men be denied the right to contract for knowledge that is originated by one and communicated as something novel to the other?
Clearly, they should not be restricted.
The preemption doctrine has been premised on a Federal policy of
competition, as evidenced by the anti-trust laws. But the fallacy is
that protection of competition cannot reside only in a slavish adherence
to a rule that we can all copy and appropriate ideas of others which
come to us not by observance and inspection of what is in the public
domain, but through channels of confidence, secrecy and mutual trust.
The patent law has never had any application to such matters, nor has
Congress or the Constitution intimated such an application. To follow
the preemption doctrine will curtail the highest order of competition, i.e.
creation of new goods, and it is urged here that the preemption being
46
expressed in court opinions be revised by timely legislation.

this article was being completed Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania
introduced Amendments Nos. 578 and 579 to S. 2756 which contain provisions
largely supported by remarks in this article.
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